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ABSTRACT
It is commonly known that High Performance Computing (HPC) systems are
most frequently used by multiple users for batch job, parallel computations. Less
well known, however, are the numerous HPC systems servicing data so sensitive
that administrators enforce either a) sequential job processing - only one job at
a time on the entire system, or b) physical separation - devoting an entire HPC
system to a single project until recommissioned. The driving forces behind this
type of security are numerous but share the common origin of data so sensitive
that measures above and beyond industry standard are used to ensure information
security. This paper presents a network security solution that provides information
security above and beyond industry standard, yet still enabling multi-user computations
on the system. This paper’s main contribution is a mechanism designed to enforce
high level time division multiplexing of network access (Time Division Multiple
Access, or TDMA) according to security groups. By dividing network access into
time windows, interactions between applications over the network can be prevented
in an easily verifiable way.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
High Performance Computing (HPC) systems consist of numerous individual computing
systems networked and administrated together such that they can be used as a single
system. Examples of these systems from popular culture include custom made
models such as the Cray I (historically one of the first systems deemed HPC) and
the modern IBM Blue Gene [25]. More common examples are simple Computer
Clusters such as Beowulf clusters in which Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
equipment is utilized [9]. These latter systems are simple enough that they are
frequently implemented by single users within hobbyists’ homes [8]. Figures 1.1,
1.2, and 1.3 show examples of these systems.
1.1 SECURITY CONCERNS
Application developers for these systems span a broad spectrum, ranging from
undergraduate students learning concurrent programming to defense contractors
executing classified simulations. Key characteristics of this spectrum are shown
in Figure 1.4. Moving towards the most demanding end of the spectrum, security
concerns among application-side stakeholders increase substantially and additional
Figure 1.1: A Beowulf
cluster [36].
Figure 1.2: The Cray
I [33].
Figure 1.3: IBM’s Blue
Gene [24].
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Little / No security
Single stakeholder
Little / No financial risk
Moderate / Thorough security
Numerous Internal / External 
stakeholders
Significant / Large financial risk
Highest security
Powerful stakeholders
Existential risk
Hobbyist Light Industry / Academic Defense / Mission Critical
spectrum
Figure 1.4: The spectrum of environmental security requirements based on uses
and stakeholders.
methods are employed to enforce information security. At some point along this
spectrum, stakeholders demand physical separation of the system from other users
during operation to satisfy security concerns. This physical separation means completely
different systems, each with its own computing and networking hardware. The
reasons behind this can be numerous, but stem from two major goals: simplicity
of implementation and verification; and risk aversion/management. In the defense
industry particularly, information security breaches can threaten the existence of
entire programs due to certification revocation from agencies such as the Department
of Defense (DoD) [30], the DoD’s Defense Security Service (DSS) agency [31], and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Such risk reasonably
implies physical separation of systems under operation from other users.
It is undeniable that physical separation provides a level of information security
that is difficult to replicate through the use of software, however the financial costs
are significant - devoting entire HPC systems to a single project, or running jobs
sequentially with downtime for data cleansing between [31].
1.2 TIME DIVISION MULTIPLE ACCESS SCHEME
This paper presents a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme of network
access as a viable alternative to physical separation. By modulating network access
2
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Infrastructure
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Compute Nodes
Figure 1.5: Unmodified computing
nodes.
Network 
Infrastructure
Node Node Node Node
Compute Nodes
Gate Gate Gate Gate
Control 
Server
Figure 1.6: TDMA overlaid onto
Figure 1.5.
between application security groups, we can provide an intuitive security mechanism,
verifiable in real-time, capable of mimicking aspects of the security provided by
physical separation. Furthermore, by implementing this mechanism at the operating
system level, it becomes transparent to user applications, meaning that no modification
to existing application code is necessary. Providing a mechanism for operating
multiple user applications on a single HPC system securely can provide substantial
monetary savings and efficiency gains over physical separation.
TDMA works by inserting gates to network access at each computing node
(computing devices devoted to executing user applications) within the system. These
gates are modulated open and closed by a central administrative program, denoted
as the control server, using knowledge of users and the data they own, denoted as
security groups. The key operation of the scheme is the control server modulating
network access of individual computing nodes such that systems executing application(s)
from one security group never have access at the same time as systems containing
data from a different security group.
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter 2 presents the two major intersections of this work with existing research:
HPC security and other examples of time division multiple access schemes. Chapter 3
3
defines the environment in which TDMA operates and the security challenges that
motivate it. Chapter 4 discusses design goals that have both practical implications in
the use of TDMA, and implications on TDMA’s extensibility. Chapter 5 describes
(both informally and formally) the operations of TDMA and constraints on its
operations within HPC settings. Chapter 6 describes our implementation of TDMA
in terms of architecture and the technology used. Chapter 7 shows and analyzes the
performance impact of TDMA on network traffic. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes
the thesis.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
The problem statement and proposed solution represent the intersection of two
somewhat disparate fields — Time Division Multiple Access and High Performance
Computing Security. Related works are therefore divided between the two.
2.1 HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING SECURITY
The size and cost of HPC environments dictates that each system is somewhat
unique. The security solutions implemented within each are similarly unique. Sandholm
et al. make an attempt at rectifying this larger problem by creating a framework
that automates user access permissions and resource allocation using ”XACML
(eXtensible Access Control Markup Language)” [35]. They further extend their
solution by tying it in to existing job submission tools (Globus Toolkit [29] and
NorduGrid [32]).
Allcock et al. developed a high-speed data transport protocol, GridFTP, as well
as a corresponding administrative service providing for the creation, registration,
and secure transportation of scientific computing datasets [3]. For efficient execution,
HPC applications must carefully consider characteristics of the data set under operation
such as file size statistics, data creation/consumption rates, and logical distribution [10].
GridFTP implements management of these characteristics while maintaining customizable
security using the authentication mechanisms defined in RFC 2228 ”FTP Security
Extensions” [15]. This solution, while useful in most scientific computing setting,
still allows for application data, albeit encrypted, to be visible over the network to
other user applications. This visibility renders it insufficient for customers with the
most stringent data security needs.
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2.2 TIME DIVISION MULTIPLE ACCESS
Mages and Feng patented a similar control scheme of computing resources via a
centralized controller over the network [28]. Their scheme, however, specifies only
local media resources of the node as under the control of the central administrative
node. Furthermore, their patent is intended for a much wider distributed use as
digital rights management and security in consumer media devices, rather than our
work on security in HPC environments.
6
Chapter 3
PROBLEM DEFINITION
We begin by defining an abstract HPC environment through which the general case
of our security challenge is shown. In this section we provide brief descriptions
of the major resources common to most HPC systems. Furthermore, to design our
mechanism, certain assumptions must be made on how each resources is operated.
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ON THE COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT
There are four basic resources in most HPC systems represented in Figure 3.1 as
a) compute nodes, b) persistent storage, c) administrative nodes, and d) network
infrastructure. Worth consideration also is the process of job allocation and the
execution of jobs.
Administrative 
Nodes
Compute 
Nodes PersistentStorage /
NAS
Network
Infrastructure
1
2
3
4
Job Submission Interface
Private
Core
Figure 3.1: An abstract HPC environment.
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Figure 3.2: The KG−200 Inline Media Encryptor, certified by the NSA for use in
securing persistent storage [1].
Compute Nodes
Compute nodes are independent computing devices designated to run user submitted
applications. These devices are capable of storing temporary data locally. They
send and receive data across network infrastructure for three main purposes:a) storing
or accessing data on the persistent storage devices; b) relaying data between other
compute nodes working in tandem on the same user application; c) and sending or
receiving commands (or reports, as the case may be) from the administrative nodes,
through which users interact.
It is assumed that these compute nodes do not run applications from different
users on the same node (i.e., co-locate disparate user applications) and that user
applications are not given administrative access at this level. No assumption is
made about the use of virtual machines on compute nodes.
Persistent Storage
Persistent storage as Network-Attached Storage (NAS) devices are capable of storing
large quantities of user application data, and are usually of much higher capacity
than the compute nodes. These devices commonly use RAID (redundant array of
inexpensive disks) technology [19] for higher storage efficiency and redundancy.
It is assumed that Inline Media Encryptors (IMEs) and POSIX permissions are
8
used to enforce data access rules within persistent storage [11]. IMEs have been
certified for use in classified networks by the U.S. National Security Administration
since 2006 [1].
Administrative Nodes
Administrative nodes are computing devices where a) both administrators and users
interact with the system, common tasks of which include issuing job or system
commands, accessing reports and results, and performing maintenance; b) resource
management software is centrally located and executed [20], common examples
include IBM’s Tivoli Workload Scheduler and the MOAB Cluster Suite by Adaptive
Computing [4][17].
It is assumed that the scheduler located here is capable of providing access to
the list of current running applications and the hardware resources devoted to them.
Network Infrastructure
Network infrastructure devices facilitate the transmission of data between nodes
within the HPC system. Mediums vary widely and include copper, optical, and
wireless. The most common technologies used in HPC environments are Ethernet
and InfiniBand [7][27].
It is assumed that the network infrastructure uses Internet Protocol to communicate
among nodes.
Job Execution
Best practices for developing jobs run on HPC systems dictates the minimization
of I/O, both to disk and over the network [38]. This I/O minimization is due to the
dramatic increase in access time as data moves further away from the CPU and main
memory. It’s over 50 times more costly to access 1MB of data from the network
9
Action Time to Complete
L1 cache reference 0.5 ns
L2 cache reference 7 ns
Main memory reference 100 ns
Read 1 MB sequentially from memory 250,000 ns
Read 1 MB sequentially from network 10,000,000 ns
Read 1 MB sequentially from disk 30,000,000 ns
Table 3.1: Access time examples showing the magnitude of difference between data
over I/O and data locally stored [12].
α ε
Execution 
Time
endstart α
Figure 3.3: The assumed model of application execution in an HPC environment.
αstart and αend are periods where execution is I/O bound, and ε is the prominent
period where execution is CPU bound. This structure adheres to research showing
batched I/O minimizes the I/O cost in terms of time.
than it is from main memory [12]. This overhead increases to almost a factor of
100 if that data is initially read from disk then sent over the network [12].
In the effort to minimize the cost of I/O transactions, previous researchers have
shown that batching I/O into larger transactions can reduce overhead [37]. The
difference between sequentially reading 1K files from network disks and reading
256MB from network disks shows a factor of 1700 improved performance by
reading in larger batches [38]. The batching of I/O, especially the most costly
forms (disk and network) is therefore considered best practice when possible [6]. It
is therefore assumed that job developers will attempt to maximize I/O batching, the
optimal case of which would have an I/O transaction history similar to that shown
in Figure 3.3.
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Solutions
Hardware Location Board Separation IME POSIX Permissions
Compute Nodes X X
Persistent Storage X X
Administrative Node X
Network Infrastructure
Table 3.2: Security challenges and technology used to solve them.
3.2 SECURITY CHALLENGE
The security fear of users with extremely sensitive data is that a different user
could, through chance or intention, acquire or manipulate their data. The four
basic resources described above represent the resources across which data may be
exposed. Table 3.2 organizes the aforementioned ways in which these resources are
secured [9].
So far we have described ways in which three of the four shared resources
are secured by technology that is either certified by national defense agencies (as
in the case of persistent storage) or intuitive and easily verifiable (as in the case
of compute node board separation and administrative POSIX permissions). This
leaves the shared networking resources as a point of data sharing.
Across the network compute nodes commonly transmit data to numerous destinations:
other compute nodes working on the same application, persistent storage for long
term access, and administrative nodes. Figure 3.4 shows examples of these common
actions.
Figure 3.5 shows examples of actions across the network that can share data
between different user applications. There are two ways this can happen:
1. a user application (App A) can transmit a network packet with the destination
listed as a compute node that is running code from a different application
11
Persistent
Storage /
NAS
Network
Infrastructure
Compute 
Node X
Compute 
Node Y
Administrative
Node
Network 
Packet
Legend
Figure 3.4: Simple example of common actions on an HPC network.
Legend
Network 
Packet
Network
Infrastructure
Compute 
Node X:
App A
Compute 
Node Y:
App B
Compute 
Node Z:
App C
Destination:
App B
Figure 3.5: Actions that could permit data sharing between different user
applications.
(App B), or
2. another user application (App C) can actively receive all network packets that
are visible over the network (commonly referred to as ”packet sniffing”).
These are the actions that must be stopped in order to secure network resources
as a shared medium.
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3.3 INSUFFICIENT SOLUTIONS
There exist current solutions for the strict problem of preventing plaintext data
sharing, but these solutions lack certain qualities that make them sufficient for the
narrow solution we’re seeking when trying to assure users assuming significant risk.
These existing solutions fail through their lack of thoroughness, lack of intuitiveness,
inability to be simply verified, and even through established security flaws.
Encryption
Socket to socket encryption is a common solution to preventing data theft over
a network, though somewhat out of place in an HPC environment due to their
overhead. This solution falls short in its inability to prevent data sharing as in the
case of App C in Figure 3.5. Though the data is encrypted, the value of the plaintext
(unencrypted data) is commonly so high that copying, storing and later decrypting
the network traffic a risk to be prevented.
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
VLANs, standardized in IEEE 802.1Q [26], are a common solution to preventing
data sharing specifically within large computing infrastructures such as data centers
and mainframes, though sometimes used in HPC environments. VLANs work by
tagging traffic on network switches and routers according to configurable tables of
LAN membership matched with physical interface, with the intention of mimicking
the configurability and security of LANs. Within the VLAN specification there lie
two inherent flaw with VLANs to verifiability that meets our envisioned users’
needs, as well as a few unresolved security flaws.
VLAN solutions are difficult to verify in two ways: a) the logic of VLAN
technology is hidden within firmware which is expensive to analyze. As VLAN
technology improves and becomes more complicated, this problem will only increase
13
in future versions of the systems [14][22]. b) VLAN hardware is commonly manufactured
by international firms that may have pressure from outside governments to include
secret backdoors in the firmware, further exacerbating the previous verification
difficulty. Examples of this uncertainty can be seen in a special report by the U.S.
House of Representatives from October 8th, 2012 [34].
Furthermore, due to backwards compatibility standards outlined in IEEE 802.1Q,
the tagging mechanism of VLANs can be abused via a ”double-encapsulated 802.1Q
/ Nested VLAN” attack which works by placing two VLAN tags on a packet. By
doing so, during certain situations it is possible for packets to ”escape” their VLAN
designation and convey messages to hosts outside their configured VLAN [39], still
allowing data sharing as in the case of App B in Figure 3.5.
14
Chapter 4
DESIGN GOALS
Chapter 3’s discussion on security flaws within HPC environments shows that there
exists an untouched niche for a software solution that replicates the security of
physical user separation. Here we describe the requirements and goals in designing
our solution to this problem.
4.1 A MORE THOROUGH AND INTUITIVE NETWORK SECURITY
The gap between the security mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3: Section 3.3 and
the current approach of physical user separation is large. From manufacturing and
political policy problems [34] to simple security flaws [39], current solutions are
insufficient. For users in this domain to accept a software approach to network
security in HPC environments, the proposed solution must be thorough, simple,
intuitive and easily verifiable. The thoroughness of physical user separation is
inherent in that it operates at the very lowest level of network operations, the
physical layer. The closer our mechanism approaches this layer, the more thorough
it will be considered.
4.2 DYNAMIC CONTROL
Within HPC environments the type, number, and scale of jobs assigned to any of
the systems can be widely varied. To handle this, the solution must be capable of
receiving and modifying policy at the start of each new job. Furthermore, to manage
performance tradeoffs a fine-grained control of the mechanism at higher resolution
than job submission rate is desired.
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4.3 NETWORK TECHNOLOGY AGNOSTICISM
Two major technologies are used to network HPC systems: Ethernet and InfiniBand.
Any tool for improving security across the broad spectrum of HPC systems must
be capable of operating in each. Further, numerous network topologies exist within
these technologies; switched fabric and tree structures are the most common for
InfiniBand and Ethernet, respectively. For our purposes we define this solution to
be network technology agnostic if it is conceptually capable of being implemented
in either Ethernet or InfiniBand networks.
4.4 USER APPLICATION TRANSPARENT
A fundamental requirement of the solution is that it be transparent to user applications.
Applications written for HPC environments are often quite complex and it is likely
that customers would be reluctant to make even minor modifications, especially to
programs written in the past that are under re-use. For our purposes we define user
application transparency as the ability to run an application without modification to
successful end on an HPC system using our solution, given that it can also do so on
a system not using our solution.
16
Chapter 5
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLE ACCESS OF NETWORK ACCESS
The TDMA scheme introduced in Chapter 1: Section 1.2 mimics the security of
physical separation by enforcing temporal separation of network access (and denial)
according to security groups. This network access denial must be enforced at the
operating system level on each compute node and controlled by the control server
which separates them into time windows. By denying disparate security groups the
ability to send or receive on the network during the same time window, both passive
(packet sniffing) and active (packet insertion) data sharing are prevented.
Figure 5.2 shows an intuitive graphical example of network access switching
between security groups as the system passes through time windows.
5.1 CENTRALIZED SCHEDULING
The size and order of time windows are controlled by a scheduling policy within
the control server. Figure 5.1 give a simple example of a round-robin policy on
two security groups, although more complex scheduling can be created to optimize
for throughput or enforce prioritization. Because the control server modulates the
opening and closing of network access at each time window, very fine grained
control of scheduling policy can be achieved. It is possible to switch from round-robin
. . .S.G. #1 S.G. #2 S.G. #1 S.G. #2 S.G. #1
Time
t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5
Figure 5.1: A simple round-robin time window policy for two security groups
(S.G.#1 and #2).
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Figure 5.2: A simple example of network access switching between two security
groups (S.G.#1 and #2).
18
scheduling during times of low network traffic to modulated window size during
heavy usage by particular users, or according to whatever quality of service scheme
best fits the applications. A number of heuristics are useful to consider for the
creation of a dynamic priority scheduling algorithm: queue memory usage of compute
nodes, number of TCP timeouts (see Section 5.2), and externally imposed priorities.
Dynamic Job Scheduling
To perform network access modulation the control server must have knowledge
of resource assignment within the system. This can be managed by a shared data
structure between the TDMA control server and the system resource manager, such
as a one-to-one mapping from IP address to user application (i.e., security group)
or by providing the control server with API access to the resource manager.
As jobs are added and finish according to the resource manager, TDMA manages
this dynamism as follows:
1. Non-allocated nodes run in a default state of network denial. Due to the
whitelist, however, these nodes are still capable of communicating with the
control server and other administrative nodes such as the resource manager.
2. Once a job is scheduled and allocated by the scheduler and resource manager,
the control server creates a security group using network information from
the resource manager and begins scheduling time windows for this security
group to communicate within itself.
Job Failure
Additional considerations must be made for the case when a scheduled job fails in
some way. There are two major ways in which jobs can fail on the system, and each
corresponds to a specific response from TDMA:
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1. the job fails gracefully. In this case, some aspect of the user application fails
but does so in a way that does not halt the compute node it is assigned. Under
this scenario, TDMA operates normally and the resource manager and job
scheduler are left to reallocate those resources and reschedule the job.
2. the job fails and halts an assigned compute node. In this case of a compute
node halting error, TDMA on that node would be unable to function. This
causes the TDMA system to enter an insecure state. Resumption from this
insecure state can only happen by cancelling all jobs on the system and
restarting again from initialization data. This is how TDMA operates in a fail
safe manner. In the case that TDMA enters an insecure state (deviation from
the operations defined in Section 5.3) it must be assumed that the erroneous
security group could have either received network traffic from an outside
security group or transmitted network traffic to an outside security group.
5.2 CONSTRAINTS ON TDMA
For TDMA to function in an HPC environment, a number of practical constraints
must be enforced. These constraints revolve around ensuring that user applications
have ample access to network resources. This implies that they do not experience
disruptively long periods of network denial.
TCP Timeout
The main consideration is of TCP timeouts, since TCP is the predominant data
transfer protocol in HPC [2]. Although application programmers can specify TCP
timeout values [13], a practical goal is to prevent delaying communication beyond
the default TCP timeout. Default values for TCP timeout vary across operating
systems with some Linux distributions being as high as 20 seconds, and Windows
operating systems being as low as 5 seconds.
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Given a TCP timeout value for the operating systems in use within an HPC
environment:
1. Time Window Size - any individual time window cannot be longer than the
default TCP timeout value. If any individual time window is that large, then
all other security groups are guaranteed to have their TCP connections reset
waiting for their time window.
2. ”Fair” Window Scheduling - time windows must be scheduled in such a
manner that no individual security group experiences a period of network
denial that lasts longer than the default TCP timeout. This constraint implies
a periodicity to time window scheduling by the control server.
Window Size
Given a TCP timeout value, timeout, for the operating systems in use within an HPC
environment, we define a relationship between window size, window transition
overhead (the time it takes to transition from one window to another), and the
timeout value.
Suppose SG is a set of security groups, sg ∈ SG, on the system, Wsg is the size
of an individual time window allotted to sg, and Osg is the time it takes to enter and
exit that time window (overhead). For any individual time window W assigned to a
security group current sg, then the following must be true:
{Wsg+Osg : ∀sg ∈ (SG/current sg)}< timeout
Intuitively, this means that for any given security group, the time windows that
occur between that group’s access to the network (both their explicitly stated length
and the overhead associated with transitioning between them) must be shorter, in
total, than the defined timeout for the system. Note that while window size (Wsg)
can be manipulated by the control server, switching overhead (Osg) is a function of
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implementation. Because this overhead reduces overall network throughput Osg is
assumed to be minimized, and thus can be considered to remain relatively constant
for each security group within a defined implementation. This equation, along with
the constancy of Osg, shows two interesting properties of TDMA operation:
1. The explicit window sizes Wsg have a definite upper bound. For any specific
windowWsg< timeout. Further, if through measurements of an implementation
the HPC administrators can learn Osg, then the specific upper bound for which
Wsg < (timeout+Osg) can be learned.
2. While window sizes are maximally bound, the value of Osg implies a practical
lower bound. As window sizes are reduced, the ratio of
Osg
Wsg
increases and
approaches 1, a point at which the entire time window is used to transition
in and out of network access. This ratio,
Osg
Wsg
, gives the fraction of time
the system as a whole spends on TDMA overhead. To maximize overall
network throughput
Osg
Wsg
must be minimized subject to {Wsg+Osg : ∀sg ∈
(SG/current sg)}< timeout.
5.3 FORMAL DEFINITION
Before discussing our implementation of the solution, we first define an abstract
definition that describes how the mechanism works beyond any specific implementation
and in a more formal way than the beginning of this chapter. The best way to
describe this mechanism is through a language that represents the mechanism in
operation. This language is defined formally by stating the grammar that generates
it.
Suppose S is a finite set of security groups, s.t. each security group s∈ S is made
up of a number of compute nodes. Given S, the language our mechanism operates
on can be generated by the following grammar. Because the language is dependent
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on the security groups S, this grammar must be generated based on it. This is done
in two steps:
First, we define the base grammar:
G1 = (V 1,Σ1,R1,A ), where
V 1 = {A ,W} non-terminal symbols
Σ1 = { /0} terminal symbols
R1 = { A → ε, rules of production
A →WA |W}
This base grammar, through the non-terminal symbols and production rules,
establishes a means of generating the base language form of unordered windows
(W ∈V 1) in an arbitrary length such as WW or WWWWW .
Next, we generate the S specific definitions. To do so it is first necessary to
define notation for two special terminal symbols and three special sets:
os,i - an open command issued to node i within security group s,
as,i - an acknowledgement received from node i within security group s,
θs - the set of all os,i terminals for security group s,
αs - the set of all as,i terminals for security group s, and
pi(A) - the set of all permutations of the set A.
These definitions allow us to define a final, special set:
Λs = pi(θs)×pi(αs)
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Intuitively, Λs is a set of ordered sets expressing each permutation of θs matched
with each permutation of αs. For example, given a security group s made up of two
elements s.t. s= {1,2}, Λs is defined:
Λs = {(os,1,os,2,as,1,as,2), (os,2,os,1,as,1,as,2),
(os,1,os,2,as,2,as,1), (os,2,os,1,as,2,as,1)}
The sets withinΛs represent all legitimate command sequences within a window
(W ) for security group s. The key property of the sets within Λs is that each node
within the security group is issued an open command, in any order, followed by
acknowledgements from each node within the security group, once again in any
order.
With these definitions established we can now formally define an S specific
grammar:
G2 = (V 2,Σ2,R2, /0), where
V 2 = {W}
Σ2 = {[os,i,as,i] : ∀i ∈ ∀s ∈ S}
R2 = {[W → λ ] : ∀λ ∈ Λs : ∀s ∈ S}
These definitions add new terminal symbols and the necessary production rules
to generate them. Note the use of Λs in the production rules. These rules provide
every possible command sequence possible for any window W s.t. every node
issued an open command is required to report back with an acknowledgement
before continuation onto another window.
Finally, the language our mechanism accepts for security group S can be formed
using the union of the previous two grammars:
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G= (V,Σ,R,A ), where
V =V 1∪V 2
Σ= Σ1∪Σ2
R= R1∪R2
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Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTATION
As a proof of concept we have implemented a version of the tool for the Linux
operating system using C++11 [16]. In this section we will describe the tool’s
architecture, operation, and how it adheres to the design goals from Chapter 4.
6.1 OVERVIEW
The tool is composed of four major components: the control server, ingress controller,
egress controller, and the state controller. The control server can be located on any
administrative node within the system, preferably co-located with the system job
scheduler. The remaining controllers are located throughout the HPC environment,
with a copy on each compute node that is designated to execute user applications.
As jobs are scheduled on the system, the control server must be informed of the
Internet Protocol, or IP, addresses assigned to that application and the assigned
security group. As jobs are run on compute nodes throughout the system the
control server communicates with the state controller on each node to designate
time windows. This communication is sent via a standard TCP communications
socket. For any given time window in which a security group does not have access
to the network, outgoing network packets are stored in a local queue while incoming
packets not sourced according to a “whitelist” firewall are ignored and deleted.
The control server is tasked with alternating time window authorization between
security groups.
The following subsections describe each components operations in further detail.
6.2 STATE CONTROLLER
The state controller has four major tasks:
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Figure 6.1: State diagram of a compute node running the state controller.
1. Securely send and receive communication with the control server including
receiving open network access commands and sending acknowledgements
that the ingress and egress controllers have been transitioned to a state of
network denial (closed).
2. Transit both the ingress and egress controllers between states of network
access and denial.
3. Track time for which it must issue state transitions and communications with
the control server.
4. Collect and store performance data on the egress queue’s memory usage.
A state machine diagram of the state controller is shown in Figure 6.1. For a
detailed algorithm of the state controller see Algorithm 2 in Appendix A.
6.3 INGRESS AND EGRESS CONTROLLERS
The ingress and egress controllers are firewall rules created and manipulated by the
state controller. The rules are implemented using iptables and NetFilter, the packet
filtering firewall technology that has come standard with the Linux kernel since
version 2.4 [40]. These controllers occur in two states, network access and network
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denial. When in the network access state, they are to allow network packets to
flow freely to and from local applications. When in the network denial state each
controller has a specific task:
1. The ingress controller must deny and drop all network packets received except
those specifically allowed according to a whitelist. This whitelist is specifically
issued by the control server at the beginning of execution, and dictates the IP
and MAC address of administrative services within the environment from
which communication must not be broken. Example of such services include
Network Time Protocol, resource scheduling communication, and the control
server itself must have an entry in this whitelist.
2. The egress controller must enqueue outgoing packets exempting those specifically
allowed through according to the aforementioned whitelist. These packets
must be stored in main memory in preparation for transmission once network
access is again granted.
When these controllers transition out of the network denial state, a certain
protocol must be followed in order to avoid the system dropping packets. All nodes
within the security group to which a state of network access is now being issued
must transition their ingress controllers before any single node within the group
transitions their egress controllers. The reason simply being that upon transitioning
egress controllers into the network access state, they will begin transmitting (in a
first-come first-served order) the packets sitting in their queue. If nodes within that
security group have yet to transition their ingress controller, packet arrivals sourced
from within their own security group would be dropped as if they were sourced
outside the security group.
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Figure 6.2: Data flow architecture of iptables, the packet filtering firewall with
NetFilter located within the Linux kernel. The input and output ”chains” within
NetFilter provide an interface for administrators to control and filter packets sent
into user space.
iptables and NetFilter
Figure 6.2 provides a concise overview of the components within iptables. With
iptables enabled, all packets sent and received from the operating system are passed
through a series of checks. At each check, iptables is capable of transforming
the data within that packet according two edicts a) routing tables and b) NetFilter
chains before data is delivered from the network to local processes and before local
processes can deliver packets to the network medium.
It is within NetFilter that the logic of the ingress and (most of the) egress
controllers are located. Within NetFilter’s input and output processes administrators
can insert “chains” of logic to redirect the flow or, or manipulate the contents of
packets. Figure 6.3 provides a visual summary of the ingress and egress controller
logic located within NetFilter as chains.
The queue structure in Figure 6.3’s output section is controlled by the egress
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Figure 6.3: A detailed look at the logic within the NetFilter chains that makeup the
Ingress and Egress controllers on compute nodes.
controller registering a special subroutine to process the packets when in the network
access state. This subroutine is registered using NetFilter’s libnet f ilter queue
library [41].
6.4 CONTROL SERVER
The control server has three major tasks:
1. Determine system network access states for the next time window.
2. Validate the closure of the previous time window.
3. Communicate the next time window states to compute nodes.
To determine the network access states for the next time window the scheduler
must run a scheduling algorithm on a few historical inputs. A state machine of
the control server is shown in Figure 6.4. The control server transitions between
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Figure 6.4: State diagram of an example window controller.
states of open network access for individual security groups. During these states
the control server waits to receive acknowledgement from the state controllers of
that security group showing network access denial has been enforced for all nodes
of the group.
For a detailed algorithm of the control server see Algorithm 1 in Appendix A.
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Chapter 7
PERFORMANCE
To analyze the performance of TDMA a series of network performance tests were
run using Netperf, an open source network performance tool that is installed by
default on most Linux distributions [18] and the common UNIX ping command.
These tests were run on a TDMA testbed run in Impact Lab at Arizona State
University.
7.1 TDMA TESTBED
The testbed consisted of five servers (four compute nodes and one control server)
each connected to a single hub according to the layout shown in Figure 7.1. For
Control Server
192.168.1.1
Hub
Compute Nodes
Node 1
192.168.1.101
Node 2
192.168.1.102
Node 3
192.168.1.103
Node 4
192.168.1.104
Security Group #1 Security Group #2
Figure 7.1: The network architecture of TDMA testbed.
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Figure 7.2: Network traffic between two security groups (S.G.#1 and #2) without
TDMA enabled. Compare to the time division visible in Figure 7.3.
reproduction purposes, the TDMA testbed is described in more detail in Appendix B.
7.2 PERFORMANCE TESTS
Using the TDMA testbed we ran three series of performance tests, one to display the
temporal division of security group packets, another to measure TDMA’s overhead
on system throughput, and a final test of impact on RTT.
Netperf
Netperf is the de facto standard for network throughput measurement [21][5][23][42]
from which we utilized two major TCP communication test types:
1. TCP Stream Performance (TCP STRM) - a simple test of bulk data transfer
in a client to server manner. This tests the combined throughput of both the
network and the networking interface of the client and server.
2. TCP Request Response (TCP RR) - a test of TCP request and response rates
between client and server. In addition to measuring the network’s throughput,
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Figure 7.3: A trace of network traffic under performance testing while TDMA
controls access.
this test measures the throughput of TCP transaction handling rather than just
buffered data transfer, the main goal of the TCP Stream Performance test.
Both of these tests are customizable by the packet payload size, send buffer, and
receive buffer.
Temporal Division
The main goal of this test was to display the temporal division of security group
packets. As such, variations on payload size and send/receive buffers makes little
difference. Figure 7.3 shows an historical trace of packets transferred by two
security groups, both running TCP STRM tests under TDMA. TDMA was configured
to have time windows of 1 second, the divisions of which are clearly visible.
Overhead
This series of tests was used to measure TDMA’s overhead when compared to the
same tests run without TDMA. In it, both TCP RR and TCP STRM tests were ran
on variations of payload size for 5 minutes each, with two security groups. Payload
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Figure 7.4: The impact of TDMA on TCP performance under two different
’netperf’ tests.
sizes (in bytes) were varied by powers of two: 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192, and 16384.
The resulting throughputs were averaged through payload sizes to create throughput
values for each test with and without TDMA enforcement. Figure 7.4 shows the
results of this test series. It is visible that, although significant, the overhead of
TDMA is not dramatic. The overhead on TCP RR was an averaged 14% reduction
in throughput, while TCP STRM tests showed a smaller 11% reduction in throughput.
ping
ping is the de facto network connectivity test. Using Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) messages, ping sends a message from a local network node to a
remote node, and the remote node should respond back if it receives this message.
If a response is received from a remote node then network connections are possible.
Reasons for ping to fail are either a lack of connectivity or firewall rules on either
machine that deny ICMP communication (not uncommon in production settings for
security reasons). For testing purposes, ping also includes the RTT of the message,
i.e. the time it took for the local node to receive a response.
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TDMA’s effect on RTT
To test TDMA’s effect on RTT, two tests were performed: the test bed run with
pings issued every .2 seconds for 5 minutes without TDMA , and another test using
pings issued every .2 seconds for 5 minutes with TDMA enabled. Without TDMA,
these pings have a mean RTT of under 1ms. The RTT of pings with TDMA enabled
are shown in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5 shows the RTT of pings under TDMA sorted according to RTT.
The results can be divided into two major sections, pings with RTT comparable
to operation without TDMA (the low RTT on the left portion of the graph) and
RTT affected by TDMA (the right side of the graph).
The linear growth (see Figure 7.6) of RTT under TDMA can be understood by
recognizing how the ping messages interact with TDMA. As the ping messages are
issued at a constant interval, during periods of network denial these messages are
being queued in order. Messages enqueued at the beginning of a network denial
period wait longer in the queue to reach the network than messages enqueued just
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Figure 7.6: Linear regression fits of two high RTT sections within RTT results
under TDMA.
before network access is enabled. Due to the steady period of message generation
(every .2 seconds), there is a steady linear increase in RTT for these messages.
Furthermore, when, during a period of network access, these messages are
received by the remote node, there is a chance that the remote node will not have
processed the message to respond in time before another period of network denial
is enforced. This can drive the RTT up to the time of two full time windows, in
this case 2 seconds (1 second per time window), in addition to delays from network
congestion, to which we attribute RTT approaching 2.5 seconds.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
The problem of preventing data sharing among users in an HPC environment is
a difficult one. Further, creating a solution that is intuitive and secure enough
to convince highly sceptical stakeholders with great levels of risk of its security
narrows available options. Solutions that exist in similar domains are presented in
Section 3.3, and shown to be insufficient for security reasons or difficult to verify.
This thesis presents a method of solving this niche problem that is thorough,
intuitive, and verifiable. TDMA was inspired by the desire to mimic the physical
separation of applications such that it will be acceptable to risk-averse stakeholders.
This inspiration manifested in a solution that performs temporal separation of users
in lieu of physical separation.
TDMA’s operations are then formalized in Section 5.3 as a grammar, providing
an unambiguous description of operations. Out implementation of TDMA on an
Ethernet network is then described and analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7. TDMA’s
effects are shown to be apparent in Figure 7.3 and its overhead shown to be within
reason considering the massive performance and financial benefits that come from
running workloads concurrently.
8.1 FURTHER WORK
Continued work on this thesis can be divided into improvements and extensions of
the current implementation, and research into possible alternative solutions to the
driving problem of preventing interactions between applications over the network
in an intuitively and verifiable way.
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Improvements on TDMA
While TDMA has been implemented for a small Ethernet testbed, more work remains
to be done. To gather more verbose performance measurements, TDMA needs to
be enforced on standard HPC workloads, rather than simple network performance
tests. While round-robin scheduling is sufficient for small testbeds, more intelligent
scheduling based on application bandwidth need should be implemented and tested.
Finally, to thoroughly convince sceptical stakeholders, formal verification of code
should be performed to ensure the formal design in Section 5.3 matched the code
that implements it.
Alternative Mechanisms
TDMA assumes a trusted agent on each compute node capable of intercepting,
blocking, and queuing network packets. In our implementation (Chapter 6) iptables
and NetFilter act as elements of this trusted agent. A possible alternative to TDMA
would be to configure this agent with packet filtering rules ensuring communication
to outside security groups fail. Filtering rules would be based on the whitelist
concept used in TDMA - each security group only allowing ingress and egress of
packets destined for nodes within its own security group and a select few administrative
nodes. As jobs are scheduled and enter the system, this alternative would work in
conjunction with the resource manager to reconfigure the whitelists on nodes within
the entering job’s security group.
This alternative provides the security benefits of TDMA without the network
bandwidth and RTT overhead of enforced time windows. The major drawback to
this alternative is the temporal sharing of network resources. Without the clearly
defined time windows, convincing verification mechanisms are more complicated
and must involve more than passive packet sniffing (the case under TDMA), such
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as automated penetration testing and auditing (verification techniques traditionally
used within industry).
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Algorithm 1 Control Server opening and closing network access windows.
1: function Open Windows(Scheduler)
2: Scheduler.initialize();
3: while End Command Not Received do
4: Security Group← Scheduler.get next group();
5: Security Group.state← STATE.OPEN;
6: for each node ∈ Security Group do
7: send(node.address,
Security Group.crypto sign(COMMAND.OPEN));
8: node.state← STATE.OPEN;
9: while Security Group.state== STATE.OPEN do
10: node response← block on receive message();
11: if node response.state== STATE.CLOSED then
12: node.state← STATE.CLOSED;
13: else
14: throw ERROR.UNCLOSED NODE;
15: Security Group.state← STATE.CLOSED;
16: for each node ∈ Security Group do
17: if node.state== STATE.OPEN then
18: Security Group.state← STATE.OPEN;
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Algorithm 2 State Controller Mechanism opening and closing network access to
nodes by security group.
1: function Node Control Mechanism
2: Queue← initialize queue;
3: while exit command not received do
4: state←Close Network Access(Queue);
5: while open command not received do
6: message← block on receive message();
7: state← Open Network Access(Queue);
8: sleep(message.time);
9: state←Close Network Access(Queue);
10: send acknowledgement(state);
11: functionClose Network Access(Queue)
12: state.egress← Network Egress.enqueue(Queue);
13: state.ingress← Network Ingress.drop packets();
14: return state
15: function Open Network Access(Queue)
16: state.ingress← Network Ingress.accept packets();
17: state.egress← Queue.process packets to network();
18: return state
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APPENDIX B
TDMA TESTBED DETAILS
49
Figure B.1: The TDMA test bed located in Impact Lab at Arizona State University.
To verify and test the mechanism a test bed was created out of five IBM x336
servers seen in Figure B.1. These servers run Ubuntu server version 12.04, with
Linux kernel 2.6.32-24, and had their network interfaces configured and connected
according to Figure 7.1. iptables/NetFilter version 1.4.4 was used in the implementation
of TDMA on this testbed.
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